Trick or Heat? Manipulating Critical Temperature-Based Control Systems
  Using Rectification Attacks by Tu, Yazhou et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
07
11
0v
4 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
4 S
ep
 20
19
Trick or Heat? Manipulating Critical Temperature-Based
Control Systems Using Rectification Aacks
Yazhou Tu∗
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
yazhou.tu1@louisiana.edu
Sara Rampazzi∗
University of Michigan
srampazz@umich.edu
Bin Hao
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
bin.hao@louisiana.edu
Angel Rodriguez
University of Michigan
angelrod@umich.edu
Kevin Fu
University of Michigan
kevinfu@umich.edu
Xiali Hei
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
xiali.hei@louisiana.edu
ABSTRACT
Temperature sensing and control systems are widely used in the
closed-loop control of critical processes such as maintaining the
thermal stability of patients, or in alarm systems for detecting
temperature-related hazards. However, the security of these sys-
tems has yet to be completely explored, leaving potential attack
surfaces that can be exploited to take control over critical systems.
In this paper we investigate the reliability of temperature-based
control systems from a security and safety perspective. We show
how unexpected consequences and safety risks can be induced by
physical-level attacks on analog temperature sensing components.
For instance, we demonstrate that an adversary could remotelyma-
nipulate the temperature sensor measurements of an infant incub-
ator to cause potential safety issues, without tampering with the
victim system or triggering automatic temperature alarms. This at-
tack exploits the unintended rectification effect that can be induced
in operational and instrumentation amplifiers to control the sensor
output, tricking the internal control loop of the victim system to
heat up or cool down. Furthermore, we show how the exploit of
this hardware-level vulnerability could affect different classes of
analog sensors that share similar signal conditioning processes.
Our experimental results indicate that conventional defenses
commonly deployed in these systems are not sufficient to mitig-
ate the threat, so we propose a prototype design of a low-cost an-
omaly detector for critical applications to ensure the integrity of
temperature sensor signals.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Embedded systems security.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems that utilize temperature sensors are extensively
employed in the supervision and automatic control of temperature-
sensitive environments such as in hospitals, laboratories, and in-
dustrial and manufacturing facilities [18, 28, 39, 72]. In particular,
closed-loop temperature control systems have become indispens-
able in many critical applications such as infant incubators that
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maintain the thermal stability of low birthweight or sick newborns
[6], and bloodbank or vaccine refrigerators that provide an optimal
preservation temperature in the cold chain [7, 10].
In this paper, we present a research study on the reliability of
temperature-based control systems and their sensors. Our study is
driven by the importance of security in safety-critical temperature-
based control systems and concerns about potential consequences
caused by compromised sensors. It may not be safe to assume that
these automatic systems would always behave as users expected
or could always be carefully attended to by alert human operat-
ors. Moreover, some adverse effects caused by unsafe temperat-
ures can be subtle and may not be detected immediately. We notice
that there are reports about how safety issues can be related to im-
proper temperature control [27, 65, 78, 85]. For instance, deaths and
injuries to neonates in incubators have been linked to thermostat
failure that caused incubator overheating and infant hyperthermia
[6]. In one case of a fatal incubatormalfunction, an infant incubator
overheated and resulted in the death of a baby [78]. While the in-
cubator’s alarm went off, the nurses did not hear it because of the
noisy, busy environment in the neonatal intensive care unit. Be-
sides, poor refrigeration could make vaccines ineffective and leave
the patients unprotected against dangerous diseases, or increase
the risk of bacterial proliferation in blood products and cause po-
tentially life-threatening transfusion reactions [12, 27, 85]. There-
fore, it is necessary to investigate and understand the security and
reliability of critical temperature-based control systems.
Our study focuses on physical-level attacks that exploit weak-
nesses in temperature sensors to manipulate temperature-based
control systems. We show that, without tampering with the tar-
get system, adversaries can remotely manipulate the control sys-
tem or circumvent temperature alarms by spoofing the temperat-
ure sensor with electromagnetic interference (EMI) signals. Unlike
previous works that utilize the generation of subharmonics in non-
linear circuit components to demodulate out-of-band EMI signals
[59], or induce signal clippings in Electro-Static Discharge (ESD)
protection circuits of a microcontroller [74], our attack exploits the
unintended rectification effect in operational and instrumentation
amplifiers to generate a controllable DC component on the ampli-
fier output that can be used to manipulate the sensor readings (Fig.
1). We conduct detailed signal injection experiments on a typical
temperature sensing circuitry and show that a stabilized voltage
level can be intentionally induced and controlled to increase or
decrease the sensor output. We analyze the vulnerability and at-
tack surface of circuit components with both direct power injec-
tion (DPI) and remote signal injection experiments. We then invest-
igate the effect of remote attacks on several off-the-shelf temper-
ature sensors and control systems that use different amplifiers. In
addition, we show how this physical-level exploit can affect other
classes of sensors that share similar signal conditioning processes.
To explore potential consequences and understand the threats
of physical-level attacks on critical temperature-based control sys-
tems, we study our attacks on an infant incubator and other real-
world systems. In particular, we show how an adversary can re-
motely manipulate an infant incubator temperature to cause life-
threatening issues. Without triggering the automatic temperature
alarms, the attack can trick the internal control system of the infant
incubator to heat the cabin up to 38.5◦C or cool it down to 29◦C ,
from attack distances of 1.9 m and 1 m respectively in the open air
with a transmitting power of 4 W. These dangerous temperatures
can raise the risk of temperature-related health issues in infants,
such as hyperthermia and hypothermia, which in turn can lead
to hypoxia, neurological complications, and even death [8, 62, 81].
We also investigate the threats on several systems equipped with
different types of temperature sensors such as laboratory thermal
control equipment and 3D printers. Our experimental results show
that these systems blindly trust the spoofed temperature sensor
readings, resulting in manipulated decision makings of the victim
system.
Our study illustrates the threat of exploiting a low-level vulner-
ability of temperature sensors in critical control systems and the
necessity to mitigate this vulnerability. We discuss several conven-
tional defenses, such as filtering and shielding, as well as their lim-
itations. To enhance the robustness of critical temperature-based
control systems and shed light on defenses against rectification
attacks on sensors, we propose a low-cost anomaly detector that
identifies malicious interference in the vulnerable frequency range.
Once the interference is detected, the signal information can be
used by the system software to estimate the sensor data reliabil-
ity. Our study aims to raise the awareness of potential threats of
compromising temperature sensors and work towards improved
security and resilience in future designs of critical temperature-
based systems.
In summary, we list our main contributions as follows:
• We investigate the reliability of temperature-based control sys-
tems and their sensors from a security and safety prospective.
We explore how unexpected consequences can be caused in
real-world systems with physical-level attacks on temperature
sensors1.
• We bridge the gap of sensor security research by explaining
how to manipulate the DC voltage of temperature sensor sig-
nals, characterizing the rectification effect that can be intention-
ally induced in amplifiers. By analyzing the attack surface of
circuit components with DPI and remote EMI injection experi-
ments, we unveil the fundamental causality of the vulnerability.
Furthermore, we show that the exploit of the rectification phe-
nomenon could affect other classes of sensors that use similar
vulnerable components.
1Demo videos of the proof-of-concept attacks are available at https://www.youtube.
com/playlist?list=PLZaFM1g7JkPgpieNXMomMTQ7w9iZ8Yn-3.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the general signal conditioning
path of a temperature sensor. Our attack can bypass conven-
tional noise filtering and generate a controllable DC voltage
offset at the ADC input.
• Based on the experimental results of our study, we discuss con-
ventional defensive strategies, their limitations and challenges;
then we propose a prototype design of an analog anomaly de-
tector to enhance the security and reliability of temperature-
based control systems.
2 BACKGROUND
In this work, we focus on the security of systems based on three
types of analog temperature sensors: thermocouples, Resistance
Temperature Devices (RTDs), and thermistors. Thermocouples op-
erate on the Seebeck effect, which occurs when two dissimilar
metals are joined at one end. The output voltage is a direct func-
tion of the temperature difference between the junction of the
metals and the target measurement point [72]. RTDs are construc-
ted of a metal, such as copper or platinum, which increases in res-
istance with increasing temperature. Compared to thermocouples,
they require voltage or current excitation, and are generally more
sensitive. Finally, thermistors are made of metal oxides and may
have either a negative or positive temperature coefficient. Neg-
ative temperature coefficient thermistors (NTCs) decrease in res-
istance with increasing temperatures, while positive temperature
coefficient thermistors (PTCs) increase in resistance with increas-
ing temperatures. Thermistors exhibit a much greater sensitivity
than thermocouples or RTDs. However, their operating temperat-
ure range is narrower.
Signal Conditioning of Analog Temperature Sensors.Analog
sensors require a signal conditioning phase before a data acquis-
ition device can effectively process the signal. Analog temperat-
ure sensors present specific signal conditioning requirements to
provide reliable and accurate measurements. For instance, the re-
lationship between the output voltage and the temperature meas-
urements is not linear, and each type of sensor exhibits its distinct-
ive non-linearity. For this reason, analog temperature sensors of-
ten require high-resolution ADCs to achieve the desired accuracy
[55]. Also, thermocouples require an additional correction to the
acquired measurement called Cold-junction compensation (CJC).
CJC accounts for the voltage offset generated at the connection
between the thermocouple and the terminals of the acquisition
device. In comparison, RTDs are often placed in bridge circuits
for detecting small resistance changes. These additional consider-
ations are used to improve the measurement accuracy.
Furthermore, because of the low-level voltage, the output sig-
nal from analog temperature sensors needs to be properly filtered
and amplified before further processing can occur (Fig. 1). RTDs
and thermistors voltage outputs are usually amplified by opera-
tional amplifiers (op-amps), while thermocouples use instrument-
ation amplifiers (in-amps) [57]. Both types of amplifiers provide
the very important function of extracting the small signals from
the temperature sensors, and also providing the adequate common-
mode noise rejection2. Filters, on the other hand, block out both
common and differential-mode noise, and the interference induced
by the 50/60 Hz power.
Inadequate design specifications of these fundamental compon-
ents can be exploited by an adversary to gain control over the
sensor and induce the target system to make automated decisions
based on untrustworthy sensor data.
Rectification Effect in Amplifiers. The rectification effect in
amplifiers is a phenomenon that converts AC signals in input to
an amplifier to a DC offset component in the output signal. This
offset is the result of the non-linear voltage-current characterist-
ics of the internal diodes formed by silicon p-n junctions inside
the transistors (FETs or BJTs) that constitute the amplifier internal
input stage [3, 40, 41, 87]. Generally, the operating point of an
amplifier, also known as quiescent point, is the DC bias required
by an amplifier to operate correctly and amplify the input signal
without distortion. Especially in low-power amplifiers, where the
input stage transistors works at low current and low impedance
levels, a high frequency sine wave injection can alter the bias level
of the amplifier, generating a DC offset in the output signal.
For example, considering a small AC voltageVx at frequencyωx
injected across the base-emitter junction ∆V = Vxcos(ωxt) of an
operational amplifier BJT-based input stage, the collector current
around the quiescent point can be express as I ′
C
= IC (VBE + ∆V )
where VBE is the base-emitter voltage. Applying the Taylor series
expansion of the transistor collector current we can observe three
main spectral components: the quiescent collector current IC ,
cos(ωx t) and cos2(ωx t). While the linear spectral term is filtered
by other stages within the device, the quadratic term remains and
contains two components, one depended by twice of the signal in-
put frequency (2ωx ) and a DC term [3]. This DC term is the recti-
fication effect, that can be expressed as a variation of the quiescent
collector current:
∆iC = (VxVT )
2 · IC4 (1)
whereVT is a constant equal to 25.68 mV at 25
◦C for BJT based
amplifiers [3]. In FET-input operational amplifiers the rectification
term of the drain current ID become ∆iD = (VxVP )
2 · IDSS2 where
IDSS is the drain current at zero gate-source voltage, and VP the
pinch-off voltage.
The analysis shows how the rectification effect in op-amps is
directly proportional to the square of the injected AC signal’s amp-
litude, independently by the type of transistor used [3].
In addition, instrumentation amplifiers are generally composed
by three op-amps, where the first two are arranged to buffer each
input to the third one. Wu et al. [87] demonstrated that the recti-
fication effect mainly happens at the non-inverting input of two
op-amps in the first stage of an in-amp. Furthermore, the resulting
DC offset at the in-amp output increases if the DC voltage differ-
ence between the inverting input and the non-inverting input of
2Depending on the conduction mode, differential-mode (or normal-mode) noise ap-
pear across the lines of an electric circuit following the same direction as the power
supply current. In contrast, in common-mode noise, current flows in the same direc-
tion along different lines with the same voltage with reference to the earth [44].
the third op-amp becomes higher. Therefore, to reduce the rectific-
ation effect, external noise signals should be eliminated before the
amplifier input with proper filtering.
Our remote attack targets temperature-based control systems
lacking effective noise suppression circuits, tuning the transmit-
ted EMI signals to a carrier frequency equal to the resonant fre-
quency of the target circuit component to maximize the injected
AC voltage and induce the rectification effect.
3 THREAT MODEL
The goal of the adversary is to spoof the temperature sensor meas-
urement and manipulate a temperature control system to heat up
or cool down to an unsafe temperature. The adversary cannot
tamper with any hardware or software of the target system. Also,
we don’t consider a malicious human operator that could directly
affect the actual temperature around the sensor or deliberately op-
erate the victim system to manipulate the temperature setpoints
of the system.
Attack Scenarios. Adversaries could launch the attack from one
to several meters away, depending on their equipment and suscept-
ibility of the victim system. Furthermore, the malicious EMI sig-
nals can penetrate many common physical barriers such as walls
and windows. For instance, the attack could be launched from out-
side of a wall/window or from adjacent rooms. An adversary could
also use a hand-held attack device that can be carried and surrepti-
tiously operated under his/her clothes. Additionally, the adversary
might secretly leave or install a small remote control EMI emitting
device around the victim system in advance of the attack. During
the attack, two parameters (frequency and amplitude of EMI sig-
nal) need to be adjusted.
Equipment. Adversaries could use commodity signal generators,
amplifiers and antennas to emit malicious EMI signals. Alternat-
ively, adversaries could purchase or make a customized small port-
able transmitter to conduct the attack; the device would be similar
to a hand-held radio transmitter (e.g., walkie-talkie) but with gain
control and a frequency range that covers the attack frequencies.
The power of EMI emitters that we use in experiments is below 4
W, but more capable adversaries might use more specialized equip-
ment and techniques to improve the attack.
Feedback.We assume that the adversary can observe the temper-
ature readings or heating/cooling indicator lights in the target sys-
tem, to ensure the induced attack effect. Alternatively, another ad-
versary or a monitoring device could help observe the feedback of
the victim system. However, the adversary does not have to ob-
serve the victim system all the time; after the adversary ensures
the attack effect and selects suitable frequencies and amplitudes of
attack signals, observations will no longer be needed.
4 COMPROMISING TEMPERATURE SENSORS
In this section, we conduct detailed signal injection experiments
on typical temperature sensing circuits to study the attack effect.
We analyze the vulnerable circuit components and attack surface
with both DPI and remote EMI injection experiments.
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Figure 2: The results of DPI experiments on different injec-
tion points of the experimental circuitry. We record the in-
duced DC voltage offset and the RMS voltage of AC signals
corresponding to different EMI frequencies.
4.1 Security Analysis
To explain how temperature sensors could be affected by rectific-
ation attacks, we build an experimental temperature sensing cir-
cuitry based on an NTC thermistor. We wire the thermistor in a
bridge circuit. Bridge circuits are commonly used in the wiring of
resistive sensors such as thermistors, RTDs and strain gauges [54].
The differential voltage generated by the bridge circuit is collec-
ted and amplified by a Texas Instruments (TI) LM1458 operational
amplifier. The details of the setup can be found in the Appendix
(Fig. 16).
Direct Power Injection (DPI) Experiments. It is difficult to
measure and analyze the exact attack effect in circuits caused by
remote EMI radiations since the path and strength of the induced
EMI signals cannot be accurately predicted. Thus, we conduct DPI
experiments to identify and analyze how EMI can affect internal
components of temperature sensors.
In DPI, EMI signals can be injected directly into desired injec-
tion points on the circuit through conductance. In this way, we
can control the power of the injected EMI signals more accur-
ately and avoid interference from unintentional EMI radiations on
other parts of the circuits. In our experiments, we connect the dir-
ect power injection circuit to each of the possible signal injection
points on the sensing circuitry.
Inducing a Stabilized DC Voltage with Specific EMI Signals.
To achieve adversarial control over the sensor output instead of
general disruptions of the sensing system, we need to induce sta-
bilized DC voltage levels to control the sensor output rather than
fluctuating interference signals to disturb it. First, we find specific
EMI signals that can be rectified by the amplification circuits to in-
duce controllable voltage levels without causing strong noises. We
inject single-tone sine-wave EMI signals to each injection point of
the experimental circuitry and sweep the frequency from 10 MHz
to 1.5 GHz at an interval of 10 MHz with an injection power of
15 dBm, which is equivalent to 32 mW. As shown in Fig. 2, we re-
cord the induced DC voltage offset as well as the root mean square
(RMS) voltage of fluctuating alternating current (AC) signals in the
output of the amplifier. We observe that EMI signals at specific
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Figure 3: The relationship between the magnitude of the in-
duced DC voltage offset and the power of directly injected
EMI signals.
frequencies induce a significant DC offset and the corresponding
AC interference signal is below the typical noise floor. Such fre-
quencies can be used in attacks to induce intentionally fabricated
signals that cannot be easily distinguished from legitimate sensor
measurements. Depending on the frequency of EMI signals, the in-
duced DC offset in the experimental circuitry could be either pos-
itive or negative, allowing adversaries to increase or decrease the
temperature measurement maliciously.
Attack Surface. The identification of the attack surface helps to
understand possible attack mechanisms and facilitates the evalu-
ation of sensor security in future system designs. As shown in Fig.
2, our DPI experiments validate that a stabilized DC voltage sig-
nal can be induced by EMI signals injected through different entry
points, including the sensor wire as well as other parts of the cir-
cuitry such as shared power lines. As a result, adversaries could
exploit sensor wires, relatively long cables or printed circuit board
(PCB) traces to inject malicious EMI signals and induce the attack
effect. The potential attack surface also includes other components
in the system that are connected to the injection points of the sens-
ing circuitry. For instance, EMI signals conducted through the char-
ging port could affect a physically co-localized microphone in a
smartphone [53]. Similarly, devices, cables and other components
that are connected to possible injection points of the temperature
sensing circuitry could also make the sensor more susceptible to
attacks and need to be considered in the design of a system.
DC Voltage and EMI Power Relationship. Adversaries need to
control the magnitude of the induced DC voltage to gain effective
control over the sensor output. Theoretically, the magnitude of the
induced DC voltage offset is directly proportional to the power of
injected EMI signals as described in Eq. (1). Therefore, in the case
of bipolar junction transistor (BJT) based amplifiers, the rectified
DC current change ∆I can be described as ∆I = (Vemi
VT
)2 · IC4 , where
Vemi is the amplitude of injected EMI signals, IC is the quiescent
collector current of the transistor, and VT is a constant. Assuming
that the equivalent resistance of the receiving circuitry is Rr , the
power of the injected EMI is Pr , we haveVemi =
√
PrRr . Therefore,
we can represent the induced DC offset as
∆VDC = ∆IRr = (VemiVT )
2 · IC4 Rr = ( RrVT )
2 · IC4 Pr (2)
We conduct DPI experiments on the experimental circuitry and
inject EMI signals to each of the injection points to validate the ef-
fectiveness of the theoretical analysis. We select the EMI frequen-
cies that correspond to peaks and troughs in Fig. 2 to affect the
Figure 4: The relationship between the induced DC voltage
offset and the attack frequency (left), and the relationship
between the magnitude of the DC voltage offset and the
transmitting power (right) in remote attacks.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time (s)
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
700
O
u
tp
u
t 
o
f 
th
e
 C
ir
c
u
it
ry
(m
V
)
60mV
260 mV
460mV
660mV
-140 mV
-360mV
Attack
starts
Attack
ends
Before
attack
Figure 5: Remotely injecting stabilized voltage levels to con-
trol the output of the temperature sensing circuitry.
output of the amplifier. As shown in Fig. 3, the power of directly
injected EMI signals is positively related to the magnitude of the
induced DC offset. The relationship can be considered as locally
proportional but presents a changing rate that gradually decreases
as the power of injected EMI signals grows.
For simplicity, we utilize the free space propagation model to
understand the relationship between the transmitting power (Pt )
and the injected power (Pr ) in remote attacks. From the Friis trans-
mission equation, we have
Pr = GtGr ( λ4piD )2Pt (3)
Gt andGr are the gains of the transmitting and receiving anten-
nas respectively. Gt depends on the type of antenna that is used
by the attacker. Note that components in the victim circuit work
as a receiving antenna. λ is the wavelength of EMI signals. D is
the attack distance between the adversary’s antenna and the vic-
tim circuit. Based on Equations 2, 3, and our previous analysis, we
can infer that the magnitude of the induced DC voltage signal is
locally proportional to the power of transmitting EMI, which will
be validated in our remote EMI injection experiments.
Spoofing the Temperature Sensor Output. We investigate re-
mote EMI injections that leverage the rectification effect in ampli-
fiers to gain adversarial control over the output of the temperature
sensing circuitry. As shown in Fig. 4, we transmit single-tone sine-
wave EMI signals and sweep the frequency from 300MHz to 1 GHz
at an interval of 10MHzwith a transmitting power of 36 dBm (equi-
valent to 4 W) and observe the induced DC voltage offset on the
oscilloscope. We find that the maximum and minimum DC voltage
offsets are induced at around 810 and 950 MHz respectively. We
then adjust the frequency of EMI signals with an interval of 1 MHz
to find the most effective frequencies that can be used in remote
attacks to maliciously increase or decrease the output voltage of
the circuitry. During the experiments, we shield the PCB with a
Figure 6: Results of remote attack experiments on K-type
shielded (KST) and unshielded (KUT) thermocouples con-
nected to the MAX31855K amplifier with an attack distance
of 3 m in the open air (left and right top). The induced tem-
perature change in different attack distances with a trans-
mitting power of 3.08 W (right bottom).
metal box and cover the probe of the oscilloscope with aluminum
shielding sleeves to mitigate unintentional interference. We aim
EMI signals to the sensor wire with a directional antenna [19] from
a horizontal distance of 0.2 m.
We demonstrate how adversaries can intentionally induce sta-
bilized voltage levels to control the output of the temperature sens-
ing circuitry by remote rectification attacks (Fig. 5). In the exper-
iment, we increase the output of the circuitry by using an attack
frequency of 807MHz and decrease it with a frequency of 953MHz.
We manipulate the magnitude of the injected DC voltage level by
adjusting the transmitting power between 0 and 2 W at an attack
distance of 0.2 m. We monitor the real-time analog output of the
circuitry with the oscilloscope and record it with an Arduino UNO
R3 microcontroller that is connected to a laptop.
4.2 Off-The-Shelf Temperature Sensors
We investigate the attack effect on several off-the-shelf temperat-
ure sensor circuits that use different amplifier breakout boards.
Thermocouple Sensors.We investigate the attack effects on both
shielded and unshielded K-type thermocouples that are connected
to a Sparkfun MAX31855K amplifier breakout board [9] with a di-
gital output interface, and an Adafruit AD8495 amplifier breakout
board [11] that has an analog output interface.
The length of the thermocouples we test is 1 m and we use an
Arduino board to sample the output of the Sparkfun MAX31855K
breakout board. As shown in Fig. 6, with an attack frequency of
589 MHz and an emitting power of 3.08 W, the attack can decrease
the temperature measurement of the unshielded thermocouple by
about 56◦C or 909◦C from an attack distance of 3 m or 0.1 m re-
spectively. We also conduct the remote attack experiments on the
Adafruit AD8495 breakout board using a similar setting and sum-
marize the results in Fig. 7.
Spoofing Attacks on Thermocouples. Adversaries that have
capabilities to deliver EMI to a victim thermocouple sensor cir-
cuitry can remotely spoof the sensor output and inject arbitrary,
attacker-chosen temperature values. We remotely inject spoofed
temperaturemeasurements to aK-type shielded thermocouple that
is connected to the MAX31855K amplifier with an attack distance
of 1 m and a transmitting power below 3.08 W. Our experiments
demonstrate the control over the temperature sensor output in two
Figure 7: Results of remote attack experiments on thermo-
couples connected to the AD8495 amplifier with an attack
distance of 0.6 m.
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Figure 8: Remote control of a K-type shielded thermocouple
at 1 m distance in two different scenarios: generating a step
function (left) and spelling of the word “HI" (right).
different scenarios (Fig. 8). We use amplitude-modulated EMI sig-
nals to control the sensor measurements. We assume a sinusoidal
carrier signal c(t) = A(t) · sin(2pi f t), where A is the amplitude of
the signal, t is the time, and f represents a frequency that induces
a DC voltage offset in the output of the victim circuitry. We vary
the amplitude A over time, according to the different scenarios.
Experiments with RTDs.We test both shielded and unshielded
PT100 RTDs connected to an Adafruit MAX31865 amplifier break-
out board [23] with remote EMI injection experiments. First, we
generate EMI signals with antennas and sweep the frequency from
10 MHz to 1.5 GHz but could not observe a stable temperature
change induced in the output of sensor. We then inject conduc-
ted EMI signals directly into the terminals of the MAX31865 board
connected to the RTD and sweep through a wider frequency range.
As shown in Fig. 9, we find that EMI signals with lower frequen-
cies around 1 or 2 MHz can be more effective to manipulate the
temperature measurement.
5 MANIPULATING TEMPERATURE-BASED
CONTROL SYSTEMS
In this section, we investigate the threats of the attack on real-
world temperature-based control systems that use different kinds
of temperature sensors, including NTC/PTC thermistors, thermo-
couples and RTDs. We evaluate the attacks on systems that are em-
ployed in medical applications such as an infant incubator, and in
laboratory equipment that control critical biological experiments
or manufacturing processes. Additionally, we investigate several
commodity PID controllers equippedwith temperature alarm func-
tions.
We summarize the results of our attack experiments in Table 1.
We show that embedded systems based on different kinds of tem-
perature sensors employed in different application areas can be af-
fected by our attacks. Our results validate that temperature-based
control systems blindly trust temperature sensor readings to make
.
Figure 9: DPI experiments on the RTD circuitry with an in-
jection power of 2.5 mW (left). The amount of induced tem-
perature change with different injection power (right).
automated decisions, which allows adversaries to exploit and ab-
use them for causing unintended consequences.
Many of the systems we test have external temperature sensor
probes that need to be deployed to measure the temperature of a
specific environment. Usually, the wiring and interfaces of systems
with external sensors could make the system more susceptible to
our attacks. Devices with internal temperature sensors might be
less susceptible but can still be affected. For instance, the UVP HB-
500 hybridization oven is covered by metal panels and most part of
the internal sensor wire is protected by additional aluminum foil,
but we notice that small gaps between the metal panels could al-
lowEMI signals to pass through and be picked up by internal cables
or PCB traces. In addition, control panels of many devices can al-
low EMI signals to enter the system. The control panels consist
of various user interface components such as screens, buttons and
lights; EMI signals could pass through the spaces between these
components. Moreover, the cables connected to components in the
control panel or peripheral devices could also pick up EMI signals
and might conduct the signals into possible injection points of the
victim temperature sensing circuitry.
ExperimentalSettings.Themaximum transmitting power of our
equipment is 36 dBm, which is equivalent to 4 W. We use a ZHL-
4240 amplifier that has an average gain of about 44 dB in the range
of 10 MHz to 2 GHz [17]. The signal source is an Agilent N5172B
vector signal generator. We use a directional antenna [19] that has
a length of 0.5 m to emit sinusoidal EMI signals with frequencies
above 300 MHz, and an extendable dipole antenna for frequencies
below 300 MHz. For most of the devices, we sweep through 300
MHz to 1 GHz with an interval of 10 MHz and observe the tem-
perature measurement of the device to find the attack frequencies.
We then adjust the frequency with a step of 1 MHz to find the
optimal attack frequency. If we could not find the attack frequen-
cies for a device in this range, we would sweep through the fre-
quency ranges of 10 to 300 MHz and 1 to 2 GHz. In Table 1, we re-
cord the maximum increase or decrease that can be induced in the
temperature measurement of the target system and corresponding
EMI frequencies with an attack distance of 0.1 m. For the Inkbird
ITC-100VH and ITC-100RH controllers, the manipulated temper-
ature can exceed the maximum temperature range of the device
at an attack distance of 0.1 m. We also record the maximum ho-
rizontal distance between the antenna and the target device that
a change of 0.5 ◦C can be induced in the temperature measure-
ment. For several devices, the maximum attack distance is out of
the dimension of our room setup, so we estimate the maximum
distance based on our indoor measurements and the relationship
between the induced temperature change and the attack distance
(From Equations 2 and 3, we have ∆VDC ∝ 1D2 ).
Table 1: Results of attack experiments on real-world temperature-based control systems
Device
Sensor†
Applications
∆TMax@0.1m (◦C) ∆TMin@0.1m (◦C) Max. Attack
Type /Freq. (MHz) /Freq. (MHz) Distance‡(m)
Air-Shields Isolette C100 Incubator NTC Medical Device +58.4/530 -15.9/847 5.8 ∗
Fisherbrand Traceable Thermometer NTC Biomedical, Lab +37/690 -22/730 3.4 ∗
Thomas Traceable Thermometer NTC Biomedical, Lab +16/640 -50/830 1.6
UVP HB-500 Hybridization Oven PTC Laboratory +42.4/516 -2.8/453 3.3
Revolutionary Science Incufridge Un Laboratory +0.9/308 -3.3/309 0.6
Sun Electronic EC12 Thermal Chamber KTC Manufacturing, Lab +3.35/686 -2.88/1300 0.3
MakerBot 3D printer Smart Extruder + KST Manufacturing, Lab +10/1000 N/A 0.25
Inkbird ITC-100VH Controller KST IoT >+78/556 N/A 11.5 ∗
Inkbird ITC-1000F Controller NTC IoT N/A -10.6/713 0.9
Inkbird ITC-100RH Controller RTD IoT >+80.9/453 N/A 16.2 ∗
† NTC/PTC: NTC/PTC thermistor, KTC: K-type thermocouple, KST: K-type shielded thermocouple, Un: Unknown.
‡ The maximum distance that we could induce a change of 0.5◦C in the temperature measurement with a transmitting power of 4 W. ∗ Estimated.
5.1 Medical Applications
5.1.1 Infant Incubator. Newborn infants regulate body temperat-
ure much less efficiently than adults [1]. Infant incubators are crit-
ical medical devices widely used in neonatal care units. These in-
cubators help maintain the thermal stability of infants - especially
preterm or sick newborns [6, 28, 68]. The temperature inside the
cabin of incubators is measured and adjusted, via a closed-loop
temperature control system, to reside within an ideal preset tem-
perature range, minimizing the risks of morbidity and mortality
[8, 62, 81].
To maintain the infant in a Neutral Thermal Environment (NTE
[25]), the closed-loop temperature control system in incubators
can operate in skin servocontrol mode (skin-mode) or air temper-
ature control mode (air-mode). The skin-mode is designed to main-
tain the neonate’s abdominal skin temperature constant, whereas
the air-mode is based on the control of the circulating incubator air
temperature [34]. The simplest way to achieve a thermoneutral en-
vironment is to maintain a constant abdominal skin temperature
between 36.0◦C and 36.5◦C , in the skin-mode. This range minim-
izes the number of calories needed to maintain normal body tem-
perature and reduces the risks of cold stress or overheating [30].
Usually, NTC thermistors are used in infant incubators to measure
the skin or air temperature and provide real-time feedback to the
closed-loop temperature control system.
To find out whether the temperature control system of an infant
incubator can be maliciously controlled and abused by adversaries
to cause safety issues, we investigate our attacks on an Air-Shields
Isolette C100 infant incubator [13]. We observe that the chassis
of the incubator is shielded with aluminum panels. However, the
large control panel, sensor interfaces, and air circulation holes on
the chassis could still allow EMI signals to enter and affect the in-
ternal system components. In our experiments, we aim the antenna
to the front control panel of the infant incubator. However, attacks
from other directions are also possible (e.g., targeting the back of
the chassis from an adjacent room).
Using a transmitting power of 4 W, our attack can maliciously
control the skin temperature sensor measurement of the infant in-
cubator with certain attack distances. As shown in Fig. 10, an ad-
versary can increase the skin temperature measurement by 8.5◦C
or decrease it by 4.3◦C from 1 m away with attack frequencies of
Cabin
Chassis
Figure 10: Infant incubator (left). The relationship between
the induced change in the skin temperaturemeasurementof
the incubator and the attack frequency with a transmitting
power of 4 W (right).
515 MHz and 910 MHz respectively. Additionally, the air temper-
ature sensor measurement of the incubator could also be affected
by the attack, but the amount of the induced change is less signi-
ficant (about 1.5◦C at an attack distance of 0.2 m). To understand
possible attack distances that can cause safety threats in the in-
cubator with a certain transmitting power, we measure the max-
imum increase and decrease that can be achieved with different
attack distances using a transmitting power of 4 W (Fig. 11). We
observe that when we change the distance, the optimal attack fre-
quency deviates slightly within a range of several tens of MHz.
This could be caused by environmental changes when we change
the distance. For instance, transmitting paths of reflected signals
in the experimental area might have changed; and conductivity of
objects nearby might affect the radiation pattern and impedance of
the antenna.We alsomeasure the relationship between the amount
of induced changes in themeasured skin temperature and transmit-
ting power (Fig. 11). The relationship is consistent with the results
of our experiments on temperature sensor circuitry in Section 4.
Temperature Alarms. During the experiments, the incubator is
functioning in the skin-mode. We notice that when the manipu-
lated skin temperature measurement significantly deviates from
the preset skin temperature, an alarm would be triggered. The in-
cubator system continuously compares the skin temperaturemeas-
urement with the preset temperature value and raise the preset
temperature alarm when a difference larger than 1◦C is detected
[13].
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Figure 11: Maximum increase/decrease in the skin temper-
ature measurement that can be achieved with different at-
tack distances using a transmitting power of 4 W (left). The
relationship between the amount of induced changes in the
measured skin temperature and transmitting power with an
attack distance of 0.2 m (right).
Additionally, a high temperature alarm would be triggered if
the air temperature is over 38.5◦C . The alarm system of the in-
cubator continuously monitors the measurement of an extra in-
ternal high air temperature sensor and raises the high temperature
alarm when the temperature exceeds the maximum temperature
limit. The high temperature limit is 38.5◦C in the Air-Shields C100
incubator [13], and could be higher in other systems [2]. Finally,
there is also a probe alarm function that detects shorted, open or
disconnected conditions in air, skin, or high temperature sensors.
However, the temperature alarm systems in incubators may not
perform safety precautions reliably if the security of the system is
compromised with physical-level attacks on temperature sensors.
As a result, adversaries can manipulate the infant incubator system
to cause safety issues without triggering any of these alarms.
Heating Attacks. An adversary can decrease the skin temperat-
ure measurement maliciously and trick the internal control loop
of the incubator to actuate the heating system. With an attack dis-
tance of 2 m, an adversary that uses a transmitting power of 4 W
can decrease the measured skin temperature by 1.8◦C (Fig. 11). Ad-
versaries can also launch the attack from an adjacent room. In our
experiments, the infant incubator is placed 0.1 m away from a wall
that has a thickness of 0.15 m and we target the back of the chassis
from an adjacent room. With the wall between the adversary and
the incubator, attacks with the same transmitting power can de-
crease the skin temperature measurement by 4.5◦C . As a result,
the system would try to compensate for the induced temperature
change to maintain the “preset temperature" by actuating the heat-
ers.
To avoid being detected by the preset temperature alarm, ad-
versaries can increase the transmitting power slowly and main-
tain the difference between the measured and preset temperature
less than 1◦C . Adversaries can manipulate the system to reach and
keep the maximum temperature of 38.5◦C without triggering the
high temperature alarm. This excessive temperature can result in
hyperthermia in newborns with consequent dehydration, lethargy,
seizures, apnea, increased risks of neurologic injury, etc. [8, 52].
Cooling Attacks. There is no automatic alarm to be triggered in
the incubator if the cabin temperature drops below a specific min-
imum threshold. As a result, with an attack distance of 1 m, an
adversary that uses a transmitting power of 4 W can manipulate
the incubator to decrease the actual temperature from the preset
36◦C to 29◦C , which is close to the room temperature during our
experiment. Adversaries trick the infant incubator to actuate the
cooling system by increasing the skin temperature measurement
maliciously. For instance, with an attack distance of 2 m, an ad-
versary can increase the skin temperature measurement by 4.2◦C
(Fig. 11). Using the same setup as the heating attack, an adversary
in the adjacent room can increase the skin temperature measure-
ment by 3.4◦C .
Moderate hypothermia occurs when the auxiliary temperature
of an infant drops below 34.9◦C and severe hypothermia can be
caused when it drops below 32◦C [8]. As we demonstrate, the at-
tack can manipulate the infant incubator to decrease the actual
temperature to the room temperature such as 29◦C without trig-
gering any alarm in the incubator system. The compromised in-
cubator system would put the newborn at risks of serious and po-
tentially life-threatening complications such as hypoxia, acidosis,
cardiorespiratory and neurological complications, etc. [8, 62].
In our experiments, the time necessary to manipulate the incub-
ator to raise the actual air temperature of the cabin to 38.5◦C is less
than 10 minutes; and it takes about 30 minutes to drop the actual
temperature to below 32◦C . Nurses usually check and record the
axillary temperature of newborns at a specific interval. Four hourly
is the general recommended interval [25, 45]. When instability oc-
curs, the interval can be every 30 to 60 minutes [25, 45]. Adversar-
ies could exploit these intervals to pursue the attack.
5.1.2 Traceable Thermometers with Alarms. Traceable thermomet-
ers that provide highly-accurate temperature measurements are
often used to monitor the quality of temperature-sensitive med-
ication such as vaccines, or biological substances [24, 46]. They
provide reliable temperature data records to assess the quality of
substances being monitored and can raise an alarm when the stor-
age temperature is out of a predefined range. We investigate our
attacks on a Thomas traceable thermometer and a Fisherbrand
traceable thermometer. Our experiments show that the integrity of
the temperature data recorded by these thermometers can be com-
promised by attacks. For instance, with an attack distance of 0.5
m and a transmitting power of 4 W, an adversary can increase the
temperature measurement of the Fisherbrand thermometer from
26◦C to 49◦C or decrease it to 20◦C . Malicious manipulations of
the measurements can result in a recorded temperature data pro-
file inconsistent with the actual quality of the biologic substances
being monitored, which could lead to the waste of effective sub-
stances or the misuse of ineffective ones that should be discarded.
Also, it is possible for adversaries to manipulate the measured tem-
perature to suppress the alarm while the actual temperature is out
of the safety range.
5.2 Laboratory Applications
5.2.1 Biological Laboratory Equipment. Temperature-based sys-
tems are widely used in biological laboratory equipment to pre-
serve biological samples or control the temperature during crit-
ical experiments. These equipment are usually well-designed and
are expected to control the temperature accurately because an un-
stable temperature environment can devastate valuable biological
Figure 12: Maximum increase/decrease in the temperature
measurement that can be achieved in attack experiments on
the hybridization oven (left) and the incufridge (right) with
different attack distances.
samples or bias the outcomes of experiments. However, in our ex-
periments, we demonstrate how they can bemaliciously comprom-
ised by adversaries.
We investigate our attacks on a hybridization oven and an in-
cufridge. The UVP HB-500 hybridization oven accurately controls
the temperature of samples in the hybridization process, enabling
consistent saturation of sample solutions. It has an internal tem-
perature sensor and is shielded with metal panels, but the gaps
between these panels could allow EMI signals to pass through and
affect internal circuit components. With an attack distance of 1 m,
an adversary can maliciously increase the temperature measure-
ment by 5.6◦C and trick the hybridization oven to cool down.
The Revolutionary Science RS-IF-202 incufridge can be used to
refrigerate or incubate specimens and biological products [4]. The
incufridge has an internal temperature sensor and is well-shielded
with metal panels. However, we find that EMI signals could enter
through the control panel of the device, which can be exploited
to spoof its temperature sensor measurement. In the experiments,
we use a transmitting power of 4 W, and we summarize the exper-
imental results in Fig. 12.
5.2.2 Thermal Chambers. Thermal chambers can provide an ac-
curately controlled thermal environment for automatic environ-
mental tests of critical components such as aircraft electronics,
satellite antennas, and implantable stents [26]. Adversarial control
or disruptions of these systems could damage expensive compon-
ents or make the results of environmental tests unreliable.
We investigate our attacks on a Sun Electronic Systems EC12
thermal chamber that is intended for automated test systems and
laboratory applications [5]. This well-shielded metal chamber is
equipped with two K-type thermocouples: The first one (thermal
chamber sensor) is hidden behind the control panel and it meas-
ures the internal temperature of the chamber; The second one (the
user probe) can be used to directly monitor the temperature of
the device under test. We set and maintain the temperature of
the chamber at 30◦C, then we turn off the heater circuit breaker
to ensure that only the temperature offset caused by the attack
is measured. In our experiments, we point the antenna towards
the double-paned glass window of the chamber and sweep a fre-
quency range of 550 MHz to 1.6 GHz using a transmitting power
of 35 dBm, which is equivalent to 3.2 W. We monitor the temper-
ature variations in both the thermal chamber probe and the user
probe. Although the sensors are placed in different locations of the
chamber and the thermal chamber sensor is protected by a metal
internal panel, our attack induces similar effects on both of the
sensors simultaneously (Fig. 13). We also measure the maximum
Thermal Chamber
Figure 13: Temperature offsets induced on the thermal
chamber with different attack distances using a transmit-
ting power of 3.2 W. Note that the injection affect both the
sensors in similar way despite the chamber shield.
increases or decreases that can be induced in the temperaturemeas-
urements with different attack distances.
5.2.3 3D Printers. In 3D printers, extruders are crucial compon-
ents that are responsible for heating and expelling the building
material (filament). The temperature control system of an extruder
constantly monitors and adjusts the temperature of its heating
chamber. During the building process, the temperature of the heat-
ing chamber must be kept within a certain tolerance range to
ensure the quality of the build and prevent buildups of the fila-
ment [38]. Compromising the temperature sensor reliability in this
fundamental phase could disrupt the printing process or damage
the product quality. We investigate our attacks on two different
extruder models: the MakerBot Smart Extruder and the Maker-
Bot Smart Extruder + (Plus). We install these extruders onto two
identical MakerBot Replicators 3D printers. Both of the two mod-
els use K-type shielded thermocouple sensors. Note that we do not
turn on the extruder heating/cooling cycle to prevent damage to
the heating chamber.Wewait until the temperature of the extruder
naturally reaches the equilibrium at room temperature (23◦C) be-
fore starting the attack.
We test the frequency range of 400 MHz to 1 GHz, observing
the temperature change of the extruder on the 3D printer’s display.
During the test, we observe two main effects: 1) With an attack
frequency of 400 MHz, the user panels of both of extruder mod-
els show that the extruder temperature is zero. Even after reload-
ing the extruder monitoring system, the displayed temperature re-
mains zero (Fig. 14 left). When we start the “preheat" functionality,
the device displays an extruder disconnection error message (Fig.
14 middle). 2) With an attack frequency of 1 GHz, we can increase
the temperaturemeasurement of the Smart Extruder Plus by amax-
imumof 10 ◦C compared to the baseline temperature (Fig. 14 right).
In this case, the system does not give any error messages or special
indications in the user panel when the measured extruder temper-
ature is changed. Therefore, adversaries can spoof the temperature
measurement to manipulate the temperature control system in the
extruder without being detected by the system. In the experiments,
we use a transmitting power of 3.2 W and we are able to induce a
temperature change of 0.5◦C at a maximum attack distance of 25
cm.
Figure 14: Results of our attack experiments on 3D printers.
With a frequency of 400 MHz, the attack causes the discon-
nection of the extruder (left, middle). With an attack fre-
quency of 1 GHz, the temperature perceived is 10◦C higher
than the actual temperature of 23◦C (right).
5.3 Consumer PID Controllers
We study the effect of our attacks on three consumer PID con-
trol modules: the Inkbird ITC-100VH, ITC-1000F, ITC-100RH. Al-
though the modules we test are mainly used in IoT applications,
devices with similar functions can be found in critical indus-
trial and manufacturing applications [20–22]. The three modules
are equipped with different types of temperature sensors. These
devices can be used to limit ormaintain the temperature of a target
environment in a specific range. When the device detects a temper-
ature that is out of the predefined range, it can raise the alarm to
alert users or switch on/off the circuit of a heating or cooling ele-
ment. Manipulation of temperature measurements can undermine
the alarm function even when the actual temperature is out of the
predefined range. Our experiments show that these modules are
not well-shielded and can be susceptible to adversarial controlwith
a relatively long attack distance. For instance, from a distance of
2 m, the attack can maliciously increase the temperature measure-
ment of the ITC-100RH controller by a maximum of 32.9◦C with
an attack frequency of 453 MHz and a transmitting power of 4 W.
6 COUNTERMEASURES
Usually manufacturers implement filters to reduce external and
internal electromagnetic interference, such as common-mode or
differential-mode filters on the amplifier input [70]. However, as
we demonstrate in our work, out-of-band EMI can induce AC
signals that bypass generic filtering and be internally rectified
through the amplifier input, output, or power supply pins. Al-
though EMI defenses are known and some are already applied to
certain critical applications [86], consumer electronics are less pro-
tected against malicious attacks that affect temperature sensors. In
this section, we discuss and simulate several passive and active
methods to detect or prevent EMI effects on temperature sensors.
6.1 Hardware Defenses
Traditional hardware defenses can take various forms according to
the level of mitigation adopted and cost/performance limitations.
Shielding. Designing short shielded wires between the temperat-
ure sensors and amplifier inputs is a good practice to avoid long
leads acting as antennas and picking up interference. However, the
common-mode noise induced by the antenna can become normal
mode at the point where the cables are connected to the circuit.
This happens because of the difference between the terminal im-
pedance of the cable and the terminal impedance of receiver circuit
[82]. In this case, a mitigation of the attack consists in adding ter-
minating resistors to the contact points. EMI enclosures can also be
used to block interference. However, openings in the shield are of-
ten required to accommodate switches, connectors, indicators, or
to provide ventilation. These openings may compromise shielding
effectiveness by providing paths for high-frequency interference to
enter the circuit board [66]. Moreover, it requires a careful thermal
modeling of the system [61]. Another approach consists of sensor
shielding when the temperature sensor needs to be externally ex-
posed. In this case, shielding is only effective against interference
if it provides a low impedance path to ground. However, some data
acquisition systems require the temperature sensor to be grounded,
such as thermocouple or RTD probes used in industrial processes
[72]. When both the shield and temperature sensors are grounded,
a ground-loop current can appear to the amplifier input terminals
due to the difference of potential developed between the sensor
ground and the amplifier ground connection [31]. When the EMI
induces common mode noise, the interference can pass through
the ground of the shield, creating a ground-loop current that can
potentially generate the rectification effect. Some techniques can
reduce but not eliminate the phenomenon, such as making the
shield connection to ground as close as possible to the sensor con-
nection to ground, or using only the ground terminal of the amp-
lifier to connect to the shield without connecting the shield to the
amplifier end.
Active and Passive Filters. In the case of op-amps and in-amps,
manufacturers apply low-pass filters at the amplifier input pins to
reduce the EMI signal energy from the input lines. In IC temper-
ature sensors that use an inverting op-amp (e.g., LM35), a filter
capacitor is placed between equal value resistors, while in IC tem-
perature sensors (e.g., LM335) that use non-inverting op-amp, the
filter capacitor is directly connected to the op-amp input. Preci-
sion in-amps in RTD and thermocouples sensors use two low-pass
filters to suppress common-mode signals in each input lane and
one capacitor to suppress differential-mode signals between the
two amplifiers input terminals [3]. These filters are not sufficient
for a complete attack mitigation due to the lines asymmetry and
frequency range with respect to our injected interference. For ex-
ample, in thermocouples, the asymmetry between the lines is ex-
acerbated due to the two different conductors tied together. For
these reasons, high precision temperature instruments contain ad-
ditional isolation circuits and active low-pass filters connected to
the amplifier input terminals to isolate the field-side and system-
side circuitry [15]. Another protection method uses a composition
of instrumentation amplifiers: three in-amps, two of these correl-
ated to one another and connected in antiphase [57].
Choke-based filters can be also used as alternative for in-amp
input filtering [57]. Despite the good noise suppression, the mater-
ials used for the inductance cores can heavily affect the filter per-
formance for high frequency EMI, making the system vulnerable
to injection attacks [84].
Amplifier outputs also need to be protected from EMI, since the
interference injected on an output line couples back into the amp-
lifier input where they are rectified and appear again on the output
as a DC offset. An RC filter and/or a ferrite bead in series with the
amplifier output are the simplest and inexpensive solutions to re-
duce the DC offset. However, for temperature systems, the output
filtering is often limited to the line frequency and its harmonics (50
Hz/60 Hz) due to the interference noise generated when systems
operate from the main power supply [36, 63].
6.2 Software Defenses
Many current temperature control systems use multiple sensors
to continuously monitor the thermal state of different measure-
ment points, or as multiple temperature reference values [3, 42].
In critical infrastructure sectors such as energy and healthcare, re-
dundant sensors are used to generate time-dependent estimates of
the critical points [50, 71]. Similar to sensor redundancy, sensor
fusion techniques might be used to combine data from different
sensors in order to produce the best estimation of the true state
of a system and decrease the system’s dependence on a single
sensor [49]. In systems that rely on temperature sensors, literature
provides various software countermeasures based on sensor fusion
[58, 60]. However, in our experiments we demonstrate how phys-
ical proximity causes similar temperature sensors to be affected
by similar attack effects (see Fig. 13). In turn, this increases the
difficulty for a sensor fusion algorithm to detect the anomalies in
small and self-contained systems, such as thermal chambers, or
incubators. In addition, complex sensor fusion techniques require
building models of the attacks effects on different sensors, using
machine learning-based or statistical techniques to recognize the
anomalies [56]. Therefore, to cover all the possible attack effects,
these approaches require accurate parameter tuning and an ex-
haustive training phase. This might not be feasible to achieve. Fur-
thermore, if the attack gradually changes the sensor data, or the
operating conditions of the system change overtime, the sensor fu-
sion algorithms might not be able to recognize the attack from the
normal system behavior.
Other techniques focus on detecting injection attacks at the
process level. A process-level intrusion detection system monitors
sensors to determine if the physical process drifts from the nor-
mal or expected behavior. Common approaches include building
Linear Dynamical State-Space (LDS) models of the physical pro-
cess, or use machine learning and data mining to detect anomalies
in the system behavior [29]. Although such approaches might de-
tect anomalous events, models are difficult to build, as they require
high effort in simulating and testing all possible attack vectors,
and building a complete and highly detailed model of the physical
process and interaction is not always feasible. Furthermore, ma-
chine learning methods that do not require a model of the physical
process involve critical feature extraction and parameter-tuning
phases that are often hard to automate and update on the discov-
ery of a new attack vector. In addition, the systems that imple-
ment these kind of techniques need to continuously check if each
sensor measurement drifts from the normal behavior captured dur-
ing the training phase, drastically augmenting the computational
and power resource costs.
Sensor redundancy, process-based techniques, and sensor fu-
sion may significantly increase the effort an adversary must
make to conduct an attack. However, implementing sophisticated
software-based defenses remains arduous in large-scale consumer
electronic devices.
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Figure 15: Block diagramand calculated gain of the anomaly
detector based on superheterodyne method.
6.3 Hardware Anomaly Detection System
For critical applications where it is not possible to implement com-
plete shielding, or an effective mitigation filtering of the system
and the sensor(s) - such as incubators - detecting the presence
of attack attempts becomes crucial for verifying and maintaining
temperature data reliability. A detection circuit can be used as a
trigger for emergency measures - such as activating a safe mode
where the system restricts its reliance on sensor data. To defend
against EMI on cardiac implantable medical devices, Foo Kune et
al. [59] proposed a cardiac probe to cross-check whether readings
from a cardiac signal coincides with the expected values. Wang
et al. [83] proposed an additional microphone to detect resonating
sound that can affect MEMS gyroscopes. Based on our results, an
effective defense for temperature-sensor-based systems that main-
tains the reliability of the temperature data should account for the
frequencies that can induce a rectification effect in the amplifier
output signal. Based on this frequency analysis, manufacturers can
modify the design of their system to detect and react to attacks in
the frequency bands of EMI signals. We propose a hardware an-
omaly detector to identify malicious signal and provide feedback
about the reliability of the measurement data.
Design of the Anomaly Detector. The EMI signal induced by
our attack can appear in many different points close to the amp-
lifier where isolation circuitry and filters don’t properly block the
high frequency signals. A detector that can measure these signals
can be implemented by connecting a low noise amplifier (LNA)
and a band-pass filter to the points (such as a trace or wire) sensit-
ive to the malicious signal (Fig. 15). By adopting the superhetero-
dyne technique typical of AM receivers [77], the EMI frequency
bands that cause significant DC offset variations can be down-
converted to an intermediate frequency (IF). Down-conversion can
be achieved by using a mixer and local oscillator. As a result, the
use of this technique allows for a “tunable filter", which we can
utilize for a tunable detector. Once the signal is digitally conver-
ted, amplitude and phase information of the malicious signals at
the intermediate frequency can be then analyzed by the processor:
(1) providing feedback on the temperature data reliability, (2) allow-
ing the estimation of the measurement error, and (3) compensating
it at the software level. The detector can be periodically activated
when a temperaturemeasurement is required. A variable oscillator
can be used to select multiple vulnerable frequency bands.
Simulation Model and Evaluation. We simulate the detector
against attacks on thermocouple sensors of the same type used
in the thermal chamber. In this simulation, our detector can detect
signals from 550 MHz to 1 GHz - the range which major affected
the sensor (shown in Fig. 6). The simulationwas designed using the
Simulink environment [16], and consists of an LNA filter with 50
dB gain 3-order Butterworth band-pass filter, followed by a mixer
block to down-convert the simulated EMI frequency to an IF fre-
quency of 400 MHz, and an IR filter for filtering the spectral im-
age components. Then, a subsequent 3-order Butterworth IF filter
block is followed by an IF amplifier block with 100 dB gain and a
noise figure of 2.5 dB. An RF Blockset testbench is used to simulate
the EMI injection attack with an emitting power of 35 dBm.
To evaluate our design, we use a Software-Defined Radio (SDR)
RTL-SDR device [64]. We choose the Realtek RTL2832U chipset
with the R820T2 tuner chip that can detect frequencies from 500
kHz up to 1.75 GHz. AnRF exposed connection, collocatedwith the
temperature sensor breakout board, is followed by an RF filter and
an LNA amplifier at 50 dB. A mixer with a local oscillator is used
for the frequency transposition. The detector also uses Automatic
Gain Control (AGC), where the gain varies with the available input
power level. As a proof of concept demonstration, we successfully
selectively detect a malicious signal at a 3 meter distance from the
transmitting antenna, in open air, at a frequency of 503 MHz (cor-
responding to one of the major effective peaks in Fig. 6). The signal
is down-converted to 400MHz (as shown in Fig. 15). By varying the
local oscillators frequency, the detector can also isolate the other
vulnerable frequency bands.
7 RELATED WORK
Analog sensor circuits are especially susceptible to EMI. Vari-
ous works [43, 47, 48] demonstrate the exploitability of the non-
linearities of different circuit components to cause systemmalfunc-
tions or sensor misreadings (see Table 2).
Foo Kune et al. [59] showed that bogus signals can be injec-
ted through low-power EMI into analog sensors such as micro-
phones, and implantable medical devices such as pacemakers and
defibrillators. Their attack method exploited the generation of sub-
harmonics of injected high frequency signals passing through com-
mon circuit components (e.g. wires, capacitors, amplifiers, and
ADCs). This unintentional demodulation effect down-converts the
high frequency signals into low frequency ones. In turn, these
low frequency signals are able to pass the protective low-pass fil-
ters and enter into the system, compromising its functionality. In
automotive field, Yan et al. [88] intentionally saturated Millimeter-
Wave Radar by injecting strong interference, causing sensor denial-
of-service in cars. Unlike these previous works, our EMI injection
exploits the rectification effect present in the internal circuitry of
operational and instrumentation amplifiers used in temperature-
based control systems.
Delsing et al. [35] and Esteves et al. [37] empirically observed
the general reaction of specific cyber-physical systems under
strong interference. Delsing et al. verified the susceptibility of a
MULLE node sensor network [51]. They observed disturbances in
the Bluetooth communication, data losses and occasionally reboot-
ing of the sensor network node. They also tested the sensor inter-
face using a temperature sensor, revealing a vulnerability of the
device due to the use of a long non-shielded connection between
the sensor and the MULLE-device. Esteves et al. investigated a
common-off-the-shelf (COTS) civilian quadricopter. They listed
several reading errors induced in the drone sensors and interfaces
by continuous interference, without exploring the causality of the
measured effect.
Recent studies [33, 73, 74] investigated the injection of strong
near-field interference to modify the input voltage of GPIO pins
in microcontrollers. In particular, the authors used EMI injection
to induce a rectification effect in the Electr-Static Discharge (ESD)
protection circuit. The ESD protection circuit is used in microcon-
trollers GPIO pins to prevent the ADCs to be exposed to out-of-
band input voltage when connected to an external analog or a di-
gital sensor. In contrast with these works, our rectification attack
directly affects the sensor amplification stage, and in particular
the internal transistors in analog sensor amplifiers, before the con-
nection with a microcontroller or the analog-to-digital conversion
stage. In addition, instrumentation and operational amplifiers that
work with low bias currents such as in temperature sensors, often
do not implement external ESD protection circuits at the ampli-
fier input, but only external current limiting resistors [32]. This
approach is used because it provides adequate protection against
overvoltage, it does not provoke high current leakage at increasing
temperature as it happens using ordinary diodes, and the resist-
ors are already present in the signal conditioning chain, since they
constitute part of the low-pass filters used to reject differential and
common-mode noise.
Physical-level Attacks on Sensors. Sensors are fundamental for
cyber-physical systems such as autonomous vehicles, drones, and
medical devices. Existing security studies on sensors have shown
how they can be compromised by different kinds of signal in-
jections other than EMI such as mechanical waves (i.e. sound),
and light. For instance, by injecting different types of light sig-
nal using lasers, Park et al. [67] compromised medical infusion
pumps to make them over/under-infuse, while Petit et al. [69]
and Shin et al. [75] generate fake obstacles in LiDARs systems
for automotive applications. Other works demonstrate how in-
tense acoustic waves can incapacitate or manipulate some mod-
els of micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) inertial sensors
[76, 79, 80, 83], while Zhang et al. [89] used ultrasonic waves
to send inaudible commands to voice assistance systems, such as
Google Home and Alexa. Similar to our work, these attacks mod-
ulate the malicious signal on top of a carrier to infiltrate the sys-
tem. However, they exploit different physical phenomena, such as
the demodulation effect, or aliasing, rather than rectification. For
this reason, defenses that mitigate these effects might be not suf-
ficient to mitigate rectification attacks, since the physics principle
exploited is different.
The novelty of ourwork stands on this new attack vector not yet
explored by previous research on sensor attacks. Further, we show
how this vulnerability of amplifiers can affect different analog tem-
perature sensors that use similar signal conditioning process.
8 DISCUSSIONS
8.1 Limitations
In our study we only consider commercial temperature-based sys-
tems that use analog temperature sensors. Our analysis focuses on
low-power attacks (less than 4 W) in the Ultra High Frequency
Table 2: Comparisons between previous studies and our work, including the targeted systems, the affected components, and
the effect induced by the attacks.
Paper System
Exploited Non-linearity Effect Affected Component
Demodulation Saturation Aliasing Rectification Transd. Wire Filter Amp. ADC GPIO
[59] Microphone  #  #      #
Implantable Medical Dev. # G# # # #   # # #
[88] Radar #  # #  # #  # #
[33, 73, 74] Microcontroller # # #  # # # #   
[35] Sensor Network # G# G# G# #  G# G# G# G#
[37] Drone # G# G# # G# G# G# G# G# #
Our work Temperature Sensor # # #  # #   # #
 Verified G#Uncertain/Unverified #Not applicable
range (UHF) 300 MHz - 3 GHz. These assumptions are acceptable
considering that our work shows how the rectification attack can
be successful with a low-power injection, even if the target system
already employs traditional EMI defenses. Also, we assume that
an adversary can attempt the attack with little effort by building
a small device or modifying a commercial system (e.g. a walkie-
talkie) that can emit EMI signals in the vulnerable frequency range.
Although the attack distance can be increased with specialized
equipment and higher transmitting power, our goal is to demon-
strate that simple amplitude-modulated EMI can induce a control-
lable voltage offset in temperature sensing circuits large enough to
deceive and manipulate a target system.
To improve the attack success rate, an adversary might need
some additional information regarding the target device, such as
the presence of automatic temperature alarms and their threshold
values. These information can be retrieved from the publicly avail-
able manuals and datasheets of the target system.
During our experiments, we observe that the amount of induced
DC offset can be affected by various factors, including the noise
rejection circuitry and shield used in the target system, the char-
acteristics of the antenna used to perform the attack (e.g., direc-
tional, monopole, etc.) and its orientation with respect to the tar-
get device. In addition, to optimize the attack effect, the adversary
often needs to position the antenna to target the parts of the vic-
tim system that are usually more susceptible (e.g., the temperature
sensor transducer, the control panel, etc.).
8.2 Attack Generalization
By exploiting this hardware-level vulnerability, adversaries could
also affect systems equipped with different classes of sensors that
use similar signal conditioning processes. For example, we find
that pressure or pH sensors may also be susceptible to adversarial
control through rectification attacks, since the transducer signal of
these sensors is weak and requires an amplification stage similar
to temperature sensors.
Pressure Sensor. Scales use pressure sensors to measure the
weight of an object. Sensor wires distributed inside of the device
can make it vulnerable to EMI injection. We test a CGOLDEN-
WALL high-precision lab digital scale that has an accuracy of 0.01
g, which can be used in jewelry, laboratory measurements. We are
able to decrease the reading of the scale by 6.37 g at a distance of
0.5 m with an attack frequency of 685 MHz. We also test an Escali
L600 L-Series High Precision Lab Scale. At an attack distance of
0.5 m, we can decrease the reading of the scale by 7 g, or increase
the reading by 13.9 g. Using the same attack technique we show
in this work, adversaries might be able to spoof the pressure or
force measurement in data acquisition or control systems to cause
unexpected consequences.
PH Sensor. A pH meter measures a low-level difference in elec-
trical potential between a pH electrode and a reference electrode.
We test an Apera Instruments PH700 Benchtop Lab pH Meter that
has an accuracy of 0.01 pH. At an attack distance of 0.5 m, we can
increase the measured pH value by 0.42 with EMI signal injections
at a frequency of 515 MHz. PH sensors can be used in closed-loop
control in SCADA systems such as water treatment facilities. Ad-
versaries might attempt to manipulate the actual pH value to dam-
age the facilities of such systems by exploiting pH sensors.
9 CONCLUSION
Temperature-based control systems fundamentally rely on sensors
to make critical decisions. So it is important to assess and im-
prove the resilience of the system in situations when temperature
sensors could be compromised. This work showed how adversaries
can manipulate these systems to cause unexpected consequences,
without tampering with the victim system or triggering temper-
ature alarms. The attack leveraged an unintended rectification ef-
fect in amplifiers to control the DC voltage of temperature sensor
signals. We validated the attack on sensors and investigated the
threat on several real-world temperature control systems. Our ex-
perimental results showed that these systems blindly trust spoofed
temperature sensor readings, leading tomanipulated decisionmak-
ings of a victim system. To mitigate the risks, we discussed sev-
eral conventional defensive techniques, and proposed a prototype
design of an analog anomaly detector to ensure the integrity of
temperature sensor signals.
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APPENDIX
The Setup of DPI Experiments on the
Experimental Temperature Sensing Circuitry
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Figure 16: The setup of direct power injections through dif-
ferent injection points of a typical NTC-based temperature
sensing circuitry. In this illustration, the signal injection cir-
cuit is connected to the injection point P1.
As shown in Fig. 16, a 1-meter NTC thermistor is wired in a
bridge circuit, which is excited by a +5V DC power source. The
differential voltage generated by the bridge circuit is collected and
amplified by a Texas Instruments (TI) LM1458 operational ampli-
fier. By measuring the output voltage of the amplifier, the resist-
ance of the thermistor and the corresponding temperature can be
calculated.We choose the circuit elements based on the schematics
of temperature sensing circuits in infant incubators [13, 14]. Dur-
ing the experiments, the +5V and ±12V DC voltage sources are
provided by an Agilent E3630A triple output power supply. We
monitor the analog amplified output with an Agilent MSOX4054A
oscilloscope.
In our DPI experiments, we connect the output of the signal in-
jection circuit to each of the signal injection points on the sensing
circuitry. A 10nF capacitor is used to decouple the DC signal in
the experimental circuitry from the signal injection circuitry. The
source of the EMI signals is an Agilent N5172B vector signal gen-
erator.
